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Abstract
This report presents the first probabilistic population forecasts for the European Union
following the approach of expert based probabilistic projections as developed at IIASA.
The central, high and low assumptions used for future fertility, mortality and migration
correspond essentially to those of Eurostat. These high-low ranges were assumed to
cover 67 percent and 90 percent of all future paths, depending on the model. The results
show convincingly that very significant population aging over the coming decades is not
just a scenario of unknown probability, but is practically a certainty. By 2050 the
proportion above age 60 is likely to increase by about 60 percent whereas the proportion
of children and youngsters will fall by about 20 percent. This trend is much less
uncertain for the elderly than for the young.
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1What Do We Know About the Future
Changes in the Proportions of Children and
Elderly in Europe?
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov
When we speak of Europe, we usually do not think of it in a geophysical sense as a specific
mass of land, but rather in a social, cultural and economic sense. It is the population of
Europe that constitutes most of our interest in Europe. This European population, however, is
not an amorphous and homogeneous mass. It is structured according to several important
criteria. In Europe, usually the first factors that come to mind are linguistics, culture and
national divides. We may also think in terms of place of residence, employment status and
social class. In focusing on these structures we sometimes tend to forget about the two most
fundamental structures of any population, namely age and gender. Gender has recently
received increasing attention, and most governments as well as the European Commission
have created special bodies to study gender issues and promote equal opportunities for men
and women. The age dimension has not yet received similar attention. But since we are
expecting very significant changes in the age distribution of Europe’s population – a rapidly
increasing number of elderly together with a shrinking number of children – the age
dimension of the population structure and all associated issues of inter-generational relations
are likely to receive increasing attention in the future.
Why should one be interested in age? At the individual level this sounds like a silly
question. Whether you are one year old, 10 years old, 40 years old or 80 years old is probably
the single most important determinant of how you feel and live, what you do, and what you
still expect from life. It is directly related to the process of socialisation, development of
skills, body strength, maturing, and last but not least, the remaining average life expectancy.
On the level of society this question is less obvious. Does it make any difference whether half
of the population is below age 15, as in some developing countries, or whether half is above
age 40, as is already the case in several European countries? It is obvious that it makes a
difference in demand for schools and for homes for the elderly. It is also evident that it
significantly affects the balance of payments in a pay-as-you-go pension system in which
those who are gainfully employed today pay for those who are entitled to retirement benefits.
And it is expected to also have significant implications for the labour market. But one may
even go beyond that and speculate about changing consumer demand and changing cultural
preferences. It is also evident, that changing family structures are intimately related with both
the reasons for population ageing (due to low fertility rates) and its consequences in terms of
family networks. More generations are alive at the same time, while simultaneously there are
2fewer siblings. These changing quantitative relationships are likely to also affect the quality
of the relationships.
Focusing here on these demographic relationships is not to say that they are
necessarily the most important changes that we will see in Europe over the next decades, but
they will without doubt present significant structural framework conditions that will affect
many aspects of life and that can be forecast over several decades with relatively high
certainty.
Population Dynamics
As compared to other social and economic factors, demographic trends are very stable and
have a great momentum. For this reason population dynamics can be projected with greater
accuracy over a longer time span. Of course, such projections are not absolutely certain
because human behaviour is not purely mechanistic and there can be unforeseen disasters.
But since most of the people that will live in 2015 are already alive today, we know with a
high probability what the age structure of the labour force is likely to be in that year.
Future population size and age structures are determined by the present age structure
and the future trends in the three basic demographic components fertility (birth rate),
mortality (death rate) and migration. Any change in the population must operate through one
of these three factors. But even rather rapid changes in one of the factors may take quite long
to impact on the total population due to the great inertia of population dynamics. If, for
instance, smaller and smaller cohorts of women are entering the childbearing ages, even a
possible increase in the mean number of children per woman may not lead to an increase in
the total number of births. Similarly, the “baby boom” of the 1960s (and not a discontinuity
in life expectancy gains) is the main reason why we expect the proportion above age 60 to
increase sharply after 2020.
The fact that there are only three factors to be considered in population projection
does not necessarily make the task easier, because the projection of each of the factors is
difficult and associated with significant uncertainties. Even the future of mortality, which
traditionally has been considered the most stable demographic trend with steady
improvements over the years, has recently become more uncertain. Over the last 50 years, life
expectancy in Western Europe has increased by about 10 years, implying an average gain of
two years per decade. Despite this significant gain that has surpassed all expectations
expressed in earlier years, most statistical offices producing projections assume a slowing of
improvements over the coming years, in some cases even constant life expectancy. Eurostat
assumes, in the medium projection, a gain in life expectancy at birth of about three years over
a period of 20 years (European Commission 1998). But there is increasing scientific
uncertainty about limits to human longevity and consequently about the future gains still to
be expected (Vaupel and Lundström 1996). In contrast to the traditionally dominating view
that we are already very close to such a limit (actually, the assumed limits are being
constantly moved upward by projectors as real gains surpass their expectations (Bucht 1996))
alternative views suggest that such limits (if they even exist at all) might be well above 100
years. This scientific uncertainty about the future trends in old-age mortality also needs to be
reflected in the population projections.
Fertility is the most influential of the three demographic components under a longer
time horizon. Changes in fertility not only impact on the number of children but also on that
of the grandchildren, etc. For this reason relatively small changes in fertility may have very
significant consequences on future population size and age structure. Despite its significance
3we know rather little about the future trends of fertility in Europe. The history since World
War II does not help us anticipate the future trend. During the so-called baby boom of the
early 1960s most Western European countries had period fertility rates of above 2.5 children
per woman. This was followed by a rapid fertility decline during the 1970s, bringing the
Western European average down to about 1.6. Since then we have seen diverging trends,
typically at levels well below replacement fertility. The most significant fertility declines
were found in the Mediterranean countries, with Italy and Spain having below 1.2 children
per woman. There are also significant regional differentials within countries. A further
uncertainty is due to the fact that it is not clear to what degree these trends are caused by
“timing” changes, i.e., a postponement of births, and how far they are reflective of the
lifetime fertility of younger generations of European women (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998).
There is no clear scientific paradigm to adequately anticipate future reproductive behaviour.
The notion of a “second demographic transition” has been suggested to capture these trends,
but it does not say where and when the endpoint of this transition should be reached (Van de
Kaa 1987; Cliquet 1991). For this reason, again, population projections need to reflect the
uncertainty through a range of fertility assumptions.
Migration is the most volatile of the three demographic components. The number of
people entering or leaving a country can change from one year to the next due to political
events or the enforcement of new legislation. The past 10 years have witnessed great ups and
downs in European migration levels. The problem with projecting migration trends is not
only the intrinsic difficulty of foreseeing such political events, but also the fact that net
migration is the result of two partly independent streams (in-migration and out-migration)
and that they depend on the conditions in both the sending and receiving countries. In this
respect projections can do little more than demonstrate the impacts of alternative net-
migration scenarios (Lutz 1993).
Probabilistic Population Projections for the EU
Policies to manage the future and meet the demographic challenges require the best available
information about future trends. The standard way to project the future population path,
which is considered most likely by experts, is a well-established methodology, the so-called
cohort component method. The more difficult issue is how to deal with uncertainty in future
demographic trends. As indicated above there are significant uncertainties associated with all
three components, fertility, mortality and migration. The usual way is to produce different
scenarios or variants, which combine alternative fertility, mortality and migration
assumptions. But here the users of projections are not informed about the likelihood of the
different scenarios, whether they are very unlikely “horror scenarios” that may be dismissed
immediately, or whether they are highly realistic trends that should be taken seriously. Only
probabilistic projections can answer these questions.
Expert-based probabilistic projections are a rather recent methodological development
(at IIASA, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria) and here we
present the first such projections for the European Union after earlier applications to Austria
(Hanika, Lutz and Scherbov 1997), Germany (Lutz and Scherbov 1998), and 13 major world
regions (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 1997).
The basic idea of the chosen approach to probabilistic population projection lies in a
process in which a group of experts defines assumptions about the likely proportion of all
possible future paths in fertility, mortality and migration that fall within a given range of high
and low values for each of the components. Since the methodology is extensively
documented elsewhere (Lutz, Goldstein and Prinz 1996; Lutz and Scherbov 1997; Lutz,
4Sanderson and Scherbov 1996, 1999) we will not go into any details here. Assuming a
normal distribution (the method also works for other distributions if there are reasons to
choose them) typical assumptions are that 67 percent or 90 percent lie within the specified
range of high and low values. Given the symmetric nature of the normal distribution the
average of the high and low values (the central or baseline assumption) is also the assumption
of highest probability. The tails of the distribution also include extreme assumptions with low
probability. Based on these three distributions a large number of simulations (1,000 in the
case of these projections) is performed by randomly drawing fertility, mortality and migration
paths from the distributions and combining them in independent cohort-component
projections. The resulting distributions of population size, sizes of specific age groups, etc.,
can then be presented numerically or graphically through selected fractiles as shown below.
The projections presented here for the whole European Union (treated as one region)
are based on the assumptions as produced by Eurostat. There three scenarios have been
defined to 2015 for each of the three components (European Commission 1998): Total
Fertility Rate: 1.41 (low), 1.64 (baseline), 1.92 (high); Life Expectancy female: 81.5 (low),
83.1 (baseline), 84.4 (high); male: 75.0 (low), 77.2 (baseline), 79.2 (high). The assumed
annual migration balances for 2010-14 are 398,000 (low), 592,000 (baseline), 788,000 (high).
For each of the components specific paths have been defined between the base year 1995 and
the target year 2015. For the extension to 2030 and 2050, which are presented in this study,
constant rates have been assumed.  Due to this correspondence of assumptions the median of
the probabilistic projections is indeed identical to the baseline scenario of Eurostat. However,
the quantitative uncertainty intervals around the median are new. For the set of projections
presented here, they are based on the additional assumption that 90 percent of all future
fertility and mortality paths fall between the stated high and low values. For migration only
67 percent has been assumed due to higher perceived uncertainty. Since annual migration
flows are much more dependent on short-term political events than fertility and mortality,
which are more difficult to predict, a significantly high degree of uncertainty has been
assumed for migration. A sensitivity analysis of these assumptions will be described later.
Figure 1 shows the results of the probabilistic projections for the total population of
the current 15 member states of the EU up to 2050. The median of these projections shows a
slight increase from the current 375 million inhabitants of the EU to around 390 million in
2020, followed by a moderate decrease to 377 million (about the present level) by 2050.
Hence population decline is not a likely medium term prospect for the European Union. The
figure also shows the fractiles of the estimated uncertainty distribution. The inner 20 percent
are represented by the black area, while the inner 60 percent are shown by the dark shaded
area. Here the margin of uncertainty is still rather small, e.g., by 2015 (i.e., 17 years from
now) 60 percent of all cases fall into a range of about 8 million up or down from the median.
And even the interval containing 95 percent of the assumed future trends is less than 20
million (or 5 percent) up or down from the median. Of course, by the middle of the next
century the trumpet will have opened further and the 95 percent interval in 2050 goes from
300 million to 413 million.
5Figure 1.  Total population, European Union.
Very different from this rather unexciting chart of total population size is Figure 2, which
shows the proportion above age 60. Here the uncertainty is not whether it will go up or down,
but by how much the proportion of elderly will increase. Presently 21 percent of Europe’s
population is above age 60. This proportion will certainly increase over the coming decades
because the increase is already pre-programmed in today’s age structure. By 2015 even the
95 percent intervals show a very narrow range of between 24 percent and 27 percent with the
median at 25.6 percent. Still in 2030 the range of uncertainty is rather narrow, with 95
percent of all future paths between 29 percent and 36 percent. In other words, it can be
considered virtually certain that the proportion of the European population above age 60 will
increase from its present 21 percent by 8 to 15 percentage points or on average to about 1.5
times its current level. This is a very significant increase by any standard. And the best thing
about these probabilistic projections is that they cannot be simply dismissed as “horror
scenarios” of unknown probability. This increase is virtually certain up to 2030. Thereafter,
the range of uncertainty opens up more quickly because the influence of the already given
age structure of today gradually diminishes, and uncertainties related to future fertility,
mortality and migration gain importance.
The expected proportion of the population below age 20 (Figure 3) is likely to further
decline over the coming decades, but it is not directly a mirror image of the proportion
elderly. For the younger population the range of uncertainty opens up much more quickly
because of the stronger direct impact of the uncertain future fertility rates and a smaller
influence of the already existing age structure. Yet it is evident that with a probability of 90
percent the proportion of children and teenagers in Europe will decline. In the median case it
declines from presently 23 percent to less than 20 percent, but in the more extreme cases it
could go below 15 percent.
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6Figure 2.  Proportion above age 60, European Union.
Figure 3.  Proportion below age 20, European Union.
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7Both of these trends combined result in a significant and virtually certain increase in
the mean age of the European population (see data in Appendix Table A5). It will increase
from a present mean age of 39.3 years to between 42 and 48 years by 2030 and even 41 and
52 years by 2050. The median is expected to increase to around 46 years. It is important to
note that these data not only reflect the increasing number of elderly and the shrinking
number of children, but they also indicate significant changes of the age pattern of the
working-age population. The average age of the population of working age (20-64 years) is
also expected to increase from 40.5 years to 43 years by 2020. Expressed in yet a different
way, the proportion of persons aged 50-60 will increase significantly, while the younger
members of the work force aged 20-29 will decline strongly. This is certain to have
significant implications for the labour market and it may also have consequences on
economic productivity as some scholars and industrialists fear.
Figure 4.  Old-age dependency ratio, European Union.
Another significant challenge will be faced by pension systems based on the transfer
across different age groups. Figure 4 plots the so-called old-age dependency ratio, which is
commonly defined as the population above age 60 divided by the population aged 20-60.
Although the ratio does not reflect the true ratio of beneficiaries to contributors in the social
security system, it still gives an important indication of the underlying demographic
dynamics. This ratio is presently around 38 percent which means that there are still almost
three working-age persons for one person above age 60. By 2040 this ratio is likely to almost
double to more than 70 percent. Already by 2018, i.e., 20 years from today, there will only be
two working-age persons for one person above age 60. This will clearly require significant
adjustments of the current pension systems that are, of course, based on many more
parameters than the demographic ratios. Being aware of the fact that the issue of pensions is
very complex and politically sensitive, here we only want to clarify two points from a strictly
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8demographic perspective. 1) It is irresponsible to limit the time horizon of any policy reform
to 2015 or even 2010 because we already know that an even more significant increase will
come thereafter, which is associated with the retirement of the baby boom generation. 2) The
probabilistic projections show that the range of uncertainty is amazingly small over the
coming decades, which implies that there is good hard evidence even for longer term reforms.
In this context, politicians cannot blame the scientists for giving them only ambiguous and
uncertain information as they can rightly do on many other issues.
Sensitivity Analysis
The projections presented above are based on the assumptions that approximately 90 percent
of all future paths in fertility and mortality and 67 percent of the paths in migration lie
between the high and low values as assumed in the Eurostat projections. Since this
assumption is based on more or less intuitive expert knowledge, it can rather easily be
challenged by others. There is no space here to go deeply into the discussion of the problems
associated with expert knowledge (for a very recent discussion of this issue, see Lee 1999;
Lutz et al. 1999; Sanderson 1999). Other experts or users of the projections may challenge
the assumptions made as being either too narrow or too broad, depending on the specific
views about the future that people may have. Generally, one may say that an underestimation
of uncertainty is more dangerous (one may be taken by surprise) than an overestimation (one
cannot provide sufficiently specific information) for many of the potential users. For this
reason, here we will compare the above results to a different set of projections which are
based on the assumption of only 67 percent of all the future fertility and mortality paths
falling into the range of the given high and low assumptions. This assumption of significantly
greater uncertainty may, of course, seem to be an overly cautious assumption, but it is worth
studying in some detail to determine how much it changes the results.
Table 1 compares the resulting uncertainty ranges for the 1,000 simulations that are
based on a 90 percent range to those based on a 67 percent range. Detailed information on
both sets of simulations is given in the appendix tables. Here the figures will only be
compared for selected years and selected indicators. 2015 has been chosen as a frequently
stated year and a target year for the Eurostat projections; 2030 is the year when the baby
boom generation has reached pension age (past age 60) and is therefore a year that deserves
special attention in the context of population ageing.
9Table 1.  Uncertainty intervals (inter-fractile ranges) based on the assumptions of 90% and
67% of all future fertility and mortality paths lying between the high and low Eurostat
assumptions. The figures give those intervals divided by the median in percentage points.
Inter-fractile ranges
20% 60% 95%
2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030
(in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
Total population
90% 1.2 2.6 4.4 9.0 9.8 21.0
67% 2.3 4.6 6.9 15.2 15.4 34.7
Mean age
90% 0.9 1.8 3.3 5.6 7.5 13.6
67% 1.6 2.4 5.1 9.8 12.2 24.1
Proportion under 20
90% 4.3 6.1 14.3 20.9 32.8 49.2
67% 6.7 10.2 24.5 36.7 55.5 87.7
Old-age dependency ratio
90% 0.6 2.6 2.0 8.7 4.7 19.0
67% 1.4 4.5 5.2 14.2 12.6 31.3
Table 1 shows the percentages indicating what proportion of the median value is
covered by the stated inter-fractile range. For example, the 21 percent in the upper right
corner of the table indicates total population size for 2030 under the assumption of 90 percent
between the high and low values of fertility and mortality. This results in a range of 82
million persons (431-349, see appendix tables) between the upper and lower bounds
indicating the 95 percent inter-fractile range of the results (divided by the median of the
population in 2030 (82/390=21 percent). Under the assumption of 67 percent between the
assumed high and low fertility and mortality assumptions, the corresponding value is 34.7
percent. As expected the resulting uncertainty intervals become broader when assuming
wider uncertainty distributions for the fertility and mortality values.
The degree of widening of the uncertainty intervals is not identical for different
population variables and different points in time. The uncertainty range opens up most
quickly for the future proportion of children because this is almost entirely dependent on
future fertility levels and much less on the given age structure which constitutes an element
of low uncertainty. Correspondingly, the mean age of the population has the lowest
uncertainty range. While under the 90 percent assumption the 95 percent uncertainty interval
is only 7.5 percent (or 3.2 years) in 2015, under the 67 percent assumption it increases to 12.2
percent (or 5.2 years). The proportion of the population above age 60 divided by that aged
20-60 (the so-called “old-age dependency ratio”) shows a similar robustness because of the
great influence that the already existing population structure still exerts over the coming
decades.
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In sum, it can be concluded from this sensitivity analysis that as expected, the
uncertainty intervals widen somewhat when only 67 percent of all future paths are assumed to
lie between the high and low values instead of 90 percent, but this does not change the
principal results in any way. Hence, if one wants to be on the very safe side, one can choose
the 67 percent assumptions, but the main trends on future population ageing in Europe remain
the same: A significant increase in the proportion elderly is practically certain. With respect
to the time horizon, uncertainty tends to be minimal over the coming two to three decades
and then starts to increase significantly.
Conclusions
This study showed clearly that massive ageing of the European population structure over the
coming decades is a certainty. Probabilistic population projections can demonstrate this fact
even more convincingly than the traditional variants or scenarios of unspecified probability.
This finding also turns out to be very robust irrespective of which specific model of
probabilistic projection is chosen or what specific assumptions are being made with respect to
the uncertainty intervals assumed for each of the three components fertility, mortality and
migration. The main reason for this robustness lies in the fact that much of the future
population ageing is already pre-programmed in today’s population age structure.
This significant population ageing is likely to affect almost every area of society, the
economy and even culture. It will change social institutions, political priorities, the
relationship between generations and the relative political weight of different age groups.
Because young citizens below a certain age do not have the right to vote in elections, in
Europe we will soon have a majority in the electorate which is of retirement age or soon to be
retired. The younger generations who will soon run our societies and will have to pay for the
pensions under our pay-as-you-go pension schemes will become a minority. Unless
appropriate mechanisms are found to give them a weighty voice in a structured manner, a
significant potential for future societal conflict will be built up. This issue as well as many
other structural changes associated with population ageing need more immediate attention by
politicians and more resources for sound scientific analysis. The future will not simply be a
continuation of the past, and mechanisms that proved useful in the past may not work in the
future. Due to the special dynamics of age structural changes described above we still have a
grace period of roughly two decades before the ageing process will hit Europe really hard in
2020-25 (when the baby boom generation retires). Shying away from reforming the pension
system under opportunistic short-term political considerations and not giving increased
attention to the issue of intergenerational equity on the micro and macro levels seem
irresponsible under this perspective.
The family in its various forms and dimensions will be right at the heart of these
processes. It will be greatly affected by these demographic changes and it holds the key for a
potential moderation or even longer term reversal of this trend through individual
reproductive decisions which in sum make up the population’s fertility level. At the moment
most of the apparent social, cultural and economic forces in Europe still seem to point
towards lower fertility. But the process of individualisation, which seems to be a basic
underlying determinant of this trend, cannot go on indefinitely because human beings by their
constitution are social beings. It is an open question, however, how far it will go and what
forces and conditions will stop or reverse the current trend. It is surprising how little we know
about this very important phenomenon. The conditions under which fertility may start to
increase again have been difficult to study scientifically not only because of its intrinsic
complexity but also because of a combination of its assumed private nature and the heavy
11
ideological load it often carries. But there is no doubt that due to the massive expected ageing
this question will receive increasing attention in the years to come.
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Appendix Tables
Appendix Table A1.  EU total population.
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0.025 374.8 376.4 377.3 374.9 370.3 364.9 358.0 348.8 337.5 323.9 308.8 292.8
0.2 374.8 377.0 380.7 381.9 381.4 379.6 376.4 371.6 365.2 356.5 346.2 334.7
0.4 374.8 377.3 382.4 385.6 387.2 387.4 386.4 383.8 380.1 374.5 367.5 359.6
0.6 374.8 377.6 384.0 389.0 392.3 394.2 394.9 394.6 393.4 390.7 386.8 381.8
0.8 374.8 377.9 385.7 392.6 397.8 402.0 405.1 407.6 409.2 409.2 408.5 407.0
0.975 374.8 378.5 389.0 399.6 408.4 416.5 423.7 431.0 438.5 445.9 451.9 457.5
Mean 374.8 377.5 383.2 387.2 389.6 390.7 390.6 389.4 387.0 383.2 378.0 371.7
Median 374.8 377.5 383.3 387.4 389.9 391.0 390.9 389.6 386.9 382.9 377.5 371.1
STDS 0.0 0.5 3.0 6.3 9.7 13.1 16.9 21.2 26.1 31.5 37.1 42.7
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Appendix Table A2.  EU proportion above age 60.
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0.025 0.211 0.216 0.223 0.233 0.244 0.256 0.272 0.286 0.291 0.289 0.282 0.273
0.2 0.211 0.216 0.225 0.238 0.251 0.266 0.285 0.304 0.314 0.316 0.314 0.311
0.4 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.240 0.254 0.271 0.293 0.313 0.326 0.331 0.333 0.332
0.6 0.211 0.216 0.227 0.242 0.258 0.276 0.300 0.323 0.338 0.345 0.348 0.350
0.8 0.211 0.216 0.228 0.244 0.262 0.282 0.308 0.333 0.351 0.361 0.369 0.375
0.975 0.211 0.217 0.230 0.250 0.270 0.294 0.325 0.357 0.381 0.399 0.415 0.430
Mean 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.241 0.256 0.274 0.297 0.319 0.333 0.339 0.343 0.344
Median 0.211 0.216 0.226 0.241 0.256 0.273 0.296 0.318 0.332 0.337 0.340 0.340
STDS 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.034 0.039
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Appendix Table A3.  EU proportion below age 20.
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0.025 0.234 0.229 0.212 0.193 0.173 0.156 0.148 0.144 0.139 0.132 0.126 0.122
0.2 0.234 0.230 0.219 0.207 0.195 0.185 0.179 0.175 0.172 0.168 0.165 0.163
0.4 0.234 0.230 0.222 0.214 0.206 0.200 0.194 0.191 0.189 0.187 0.185 0.184
0.6 0.234 0.231 0.225 0.220 0.215 0.210 0.206 0.203 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
0.8 0.234 0.231 0.228 0.226 0.225 0.223 0.219 0.216 0.217 0.218 0.220 0.221
0.975 0.234 0.232 0.233 0.238 0.242 0.245 0.242 0.240 0.242 0.248 0.253 0.256
Mean 0.234 0.230 0.223 0.217 0.210 0.204 0.199 0.196 0.194 0.193 0.193 0.192
Median 0.234 0.230 0.223 0.217 0.210 0.205 0.200 0.196 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.192
STDS 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.011 0.017 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.034
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Appendix Table A4.  EU old age dependency ratio.
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0.025 0.380 0.390 0.407 0.434 0.462 0.496 0.547 0.597 0.620 0.618 0.606 0.582
0.2 0.380 0.390 0.409 0.440 0.472 0.513 0.570 0.628 0.665 0.673 0.671 0.659
0.4 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.443 0.478 0.521 0.582 0.647 0.689 0.704 0.710 0.708
0.6 0.380 0.391 0.412 0.446 0.483 0.529 0.594 0.664 0.715 0.737 0.752 0.757
0.8 0.380 0.391 0.413 0.449 0.488 0.537 0.607 0.685 0.745 0.777 0.800 0.816
0.975 0.380 0.391 0.415 0.455 0.498 0.553 0.632 0.724 0.805 0.860 0.912 0.960
Mean 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.445 0.480 0.525 0.588 0.657 0.705 0.727 0.738 0.742
Median 0.380 0.391 0.411 0.445 0.480 0.525 0.588 0.655 0.703 0.723 0.732 0.732
STDS 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.022 0.033 0.048 0.063 0.079 0.098
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Appendix Table A5.  EU mean age.
Interval 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
0.025 39.3 39.6 40.1 40.6 41.1 41.6 41.9 42.1 42.1 41.9 41.7 41.5
0.2 39.3 39.6 40.4 41.2 41.9 42.6 43.2 43.7 44.0 44.2 44.3 44.2
0.4 39.3 39.7 40.6 41.5 42.4 43.2 43.9 44.5 45.0 45.4 45.7 45.8
0.6 39.3 39.7 40.7 41.7 42.8 43.7 44.6 45.3 45.9 46.5 46.8 47.1
0.8 39.3 39.7 40.9 42.1 43.3 44.3 45.3 46.2 47.1 47.8 48.4 48.7
0.975 39.3 39.8 41.2 42.8 44.3 45.7 47.0 48.3 49.5 50.7 51.7 52.4
Mean 39.3 39.7 40.6 41.6 42.6 43.5 44.3 45.0 45.6 46.0 46.4 46.6
Median 39.3 39.7 40.6 41.6 42.6 43.5 44.3 44.9 45.5 45.9 46.2 46.4
STDS 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8
